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Survey and interview data about life after welfare reform were collected
from food pantry clients in upstate New York in 1997 and 1999. By 1999,
respondents were increasingly likely to have no work or benefits. Having
no work or benefits was also associated with having been penalized (sanc-
tioned) for not working or for noncompliance with welfare rules. Sanctions
for not working averaged 89 days. Clients sanctioned for job loss tended
to report problems with health (including children's health). Sanctioned
individuals reported relatively high levels of financial strain, unstable
housing, children's changing schools, and lack of a phone. Implications
for policy and practice are discussed.
Since national implementation of welfare reform through pas-
sage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act of 1996, many states have reported substantial
decreases in welfare caseloads (USDHHS, 1998a). Generally it is
assumed that welfare caseloads are decreasing as clients enter
the work force. Yet one post-welfare-reform study conducted at
social service agencies and charities in 10 states (NETWORK,
1999) found a sharp rise in the number of people who had neither
welfare nor work. Food pantry and soup kitchen users were
most likely to report unmet health and utility needs, and go-
ing without food. The present study asks to what extent food
pantry clients' reports of receiving wages or benefits changed
from 1997 to 1999. Using quantitative and qualitative data, the
study also asks if welfare penalties (sanctions) involving cuts
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or reductions in benefits were associated with clients' report-
ing life strain or financial strain, and asks about reasons for
sanctions.
Welfare Reform, the Work-Participation Formula, and Sanctions
Once a federal entitlement for the poor-Aid to Families with
Dependent Children-welfare has been restructured as Tempo-
rary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) run by states [Eitzen
& Zinn, 2000; National Governors' Association, National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures, & American Public Welfare Association
(NGA et al.), n.d.]. TANF rules are meant to move individuals
from welfare to work. In exchange for welfare, TANF recipients
are asked to take part in job search activities or to perform com-
munity service work (workfare), and to find paid work within 24
months of first receiving benefits. Those who do not find paid
work within two years must take workfare. There is a 5-year
lifetime cap on receipt of TANF benefits.
TANF rules also push states to move people from welfare
to work. States only get full TANF block grants from the U.S.
government if they raise welfare recipients' participation in work
to acceptable levels, which rise over a 5-year period. To count
as workers in state totals, individuals must work at least 20
hours a week, two-parent families a combined 30 hours a week
(family caretakers with children under three are exempted). Work
may include community service or vocational training but not
college, unless states make exceptions. State access to TANF funds
is calculated using a work-participation formula: states must
show a sufficiently high ratio of TANF workers relative to all
TANF recipients. If the number of TANF recipients in the formula
denominator is reduced, states look more successful in putting
welfare recipients to work. As one way to subtract non-workers
from the denominator, states may subtract people who have
"refused to work" within the past month and been penalized
(sanctioned) for no more than three months in the past year with
cuts or reductions in welfare and food stamps. Where sanctions
take people off the welfare rolls for the short or long term, they
can also make state welfare reform look more successful (Rogers-
Dillon & Skrentny, 1999; Tyson, 1998).
Food Pantry Clients and Welfare Reform 103
Leaving the Welfare Rolls but not Getting Work:
Job Loss and Sanctions
Although TANF pushes welfare recipients to work, some
may have trouble with employment. Those individuals could
start work, go off welfare, and then lose work; thus, although
people might leave the welfare rolls, they would not necessar-
ily be getting work. Those who might have trouble getting or
keeping work include those who have little education, low self-
esteem, or medical, mental health or substance use problems
(Danziger, Corcoran, Danziger, Heflin, Kald, et al., 2000; Olson &
Pavetti, 1996). In 1996, not only was welfare reform implemented
but Supplemental Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits
for substance use were cut and renewed for only about 35% of
those who reapplied (Lewin & Westat, 1998). Those who turned
to TANF might have had trouble meeting its work rules due
to substance use or other barriers; in general, substance users
have relatively high rates of unemployment (see Metsch, McCoy,
Miller, McAnany, & Pereyra, 2000).
In 1996 criteria for granting Supplemental Security Insur-
ance (SSI) benefits to children with disabilities were also tight-
ened (Eitzen & Zinn, 2000). Mothers who have been on wel-
fare are especially likely to have children who are chronically
ill, and may find it difficult both to take care of children and
work at jobs with inflexible schedules and few sick days (Hey-
mann & Earle, 1999); 79% of the welfare mothers in Puntenney's
(1998) sample were caring for a family member or network mem-
ber with a serious health problem. Childcare and transportation
are other great needs of poor working families (Edin & Lein,
1997), yet some states provide little assistance for those needs
(Tufts Center on Hunger and Poverty, 1998). Such problems-and
especially health issues-help explain 25% to 40% rates of job
loss among workers just off welfare (Hershey & Pavetti, 1997;
USDHHS, 1998b).
When other work is not available, welfare recipients may take
community service workfare in exchange for benefits; however,
the U.S. Conference of Mayors (1997) found that 92% of cities
surveyed did not have enough low-skill jobs to put welfare recip-
ients to work (see Jensen & Chitose, 1997). Katz (1989) described
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workfare as work for relatively short periods in jobs that offer
no training or remedial education, and tend not to boost wages
enough to lift people out of poverty. Some may not wish to take
or keep such work, leading to noncompliance with workfare and
sanctions. In general, sanctions have been applied more often and
for longer periods than in the past, but do not improve compliance
with work programs (USDHHS, 1997).
The extent to which states or caseworkers cut welfare benefits
for noncompliance with welfare rules varies widely (Associated
Press, 1999; Froomkin, 1998). Even when unemployed individ-
uals want to work, some states may construe "refusal to work"
broadly and may impose sanctions. Writing about a Florida state
welfare reform program (implemented prior to national reform),
Rogers-Dillon and Skrentny (1999) noted that it received national
media attention and intense pressure to succeed from the start.
Because supervisors thought "having an unemployed compliant
participant would reflect a failure within the program" (p. 19),
they defined noncompliance as not having gotten work within
the welfare reform time limit, and structured review of cases and
penalties accordingly. Thus, even for compliant welfare recipi-
ents, not working could be associated with a greater likelihood of
being penalized with cuts in benefits.
Financial Strain. Upon losing welfare, people may in turn lose
resources useful for getting or keeping work-for example, cash
for rent and other needs. Tightened welfare reform restrictions on
eligibility for food stamps may also increase strain. Little is known
about how sanctions or welfare cuts affect welfare recipients. One
study (cited in Tweedie, 1998) found that 53% of sanctioned work-
ers planned to get jobs, but only 30% could; 47% then depended
on relatives, although only 23% had planned to; 38% reapplied
for benefits. In a study of state welfare reform, sanctions saved
programs money but did not lead to higher worker earnings
(Riccio & Orenstein, 1996). Given a shortage of available jobs,
sanctioned individuals may not be able to get work to make up
for lost benefits and may experience serious financial strain.
Work and Welfare in the Area Studied Here
In the upstate New York city studied here, the economy has
stagnated since the decline of three major manufacturing in-
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dustries, including I.B.M.; nor does the nearby rural area offer
much work (Fitchen, 1995). Applicants for work include better-
educated displaced workers, students, and retirees, as well as peo-
ple moving from New York City, which has a 9% unemployment
rate that has helped raise the state rate to 5.5% (Children's Defense
Fund, 1998). In December of 1996 Broome County began imple-
menting welfare reform legislation; 20-25% of county welfare
recipients have gotten work in each year since. Work sites vary
in whether they provide mentorship and training; some assume
workers come ready to work. In 1997, 5% of county welfare-to-
work participants were sanctioned, with numbers dropping to 4%
since-a change attributed to growing acceptance of workfare.
Tufts' Center on Hunger and Poverty (1998) ranked New York in
the middle of states for welfare reform incentives and penalties.
Hypotheses: This study asked to what extent receipt of benefits
and wages changed for two independent samples from 1997
to 1999. NETWORK (1999) found that over time, social service
clients were increasingly likely to have neither welfare nor work,
with food pantry clients being especially likely to lack resources.
This study hypothesized that (1) compared to food pantry clients
in 1997, by 1999 clients would be less likely to receive welfare and
other benefits (e.g., SSI or food stamps) but would not be more
likely to work. Further, because sanctioned individuals might
be especially likely to have had benefits cut as a result of not
working, (2) they might be especially likely to have neither work
nor benefits, and (3) might report more financial and life strain
than others did. (4) Those sanctioned for not working might tend
to report problems with health, substance use, childcare, and
workfare. Qualitative data from interviews will also be cited to
illustrate perceptions of reasons for and the impact of sanctions.
Method
Procedure and Sample
The agency conducting the study was located downtown,
near poor neighborhoods, in a small city in upstate New York.
Surveys about welfare reform were conducted in July and August
of 1997, and again with a new group of clients in March and April
of 1999. The agency's food pantry supplied a free bag of groceries
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per family once a month. Clients were asked to volunteer to
take the confidential 20-minute survey as they waited for food,
clothing, or services. About 60% of clients asked to participate
did so. Trained volunteers orally administered surveys in a quiet
room near the waiting room, and took notes as respondents spoke
of life after welfare reform in unrecorded interviews. The notes
were used as the basis for coding narrative themes.
Demographic characteristics of the 1997 (N = 131) and 1999 (N
= 160) samples did not differ significantly and thus are presented
together. Because this study pertains to people eligible for welfare,
data from 11 people aged 65 or older were omitted; only one
person in that group (a caretaker grandparent) received welfare.
To conduct analyses on independent samples for 1997 and 1999,
4 people surveyed in both years were omitted. Demographic
characteristics of the remaining group (N = 270) are given in Table
1. The sample was 60% female and 73% non-Hispanic White, of
average age 37.2 (SD = 10.1); 1999 data showed that clients had
about 11.4 years of education (SD = 2.2), and 44% less than a high
school degree. Half of clients (51%) had children. Agency data
showed that most clients made less than $10,000/year. People
getting substance use treatment were less likely than others to
report working, X 2(1) = 3.84, p < .05.
Measures and Data Analysis
A somewhat more extensive set of measures was collected
in 1997 than in 1999. In 1997 respondents completed survey
items about life strain or financial strain in the past six months-
whether they had moved due to lack of rent, or had a child change
schools; and whether it was easier, about the same, or harder to
pay for adult health care, rent, food, or bills (e.g., for utilities or
the phone) than it had been six months before. The latter items
were recoded to indicate increased financial difficulty or not.
Respondents also noted whether they had gone without food
for a day in the past month, and in both years noted whether
they had a phone. In both years, respondents reported whether
they had received wages, unemployment benefits, substance use
treatment, welfare, SSI/SSDI, housing benefits, food stamps, gov-
ernment child care, or government medical benefits in the past six
months. Welfare recipients could have received TANF or General
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
Demographic item n Percent or Mean (SD)
Gender
Women 161 60%
Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White 197 73%
African-American 47 17%
Latino 14 5%
Other ethnicities 12 5%
Recoded age
18-34 124 46%
35-49 111 41%
50-64 35 13%
Number of adults in household
(mean) 270 1.6 (0.8)
One 146 54%
Two 101 37%
Three or more 23 9%
Number of children in household
(mean) 270 1.3 (1.8)
None 132 49%
One 43 16%
Two 35 13%
Three or more 60 22%
Number of children
(Parents only) 138 2.6 (1.7)
Age of children
(mean in years) 138 7.5 (4.5)
Assistance. A No work/No benefits item was coded for whether
people received wages or any of the benefits above (except sub-
stance use treatment or child care), or had no such resources.
Respondents also noted if they had been sanctioned and how
many times; in 1997 lengths of sanctions were noted. Reasons
for sanctions were coded from narratives into three categories:
(a) Not working-losing work or being fired, not taking work-
fare, or quitting work; (b) Noncompliance-such as unreported
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income, not complying with job search rules, or breaking rules
(e.g., selling food stamps); and (c) Minor infractions-missing
job appointments or interviews, or leaving drug treatment early.
The first author coded all narratives; a second rater 20% of them;
inter-rater reliability exceeded .90.
To compare 1997 and 1999 data on receipt of wages and
benefits, a first set of logistic regressions was estimated in which
dependent variables were receipt of earnings or each of the ben-
efits (coded 1 if received, 0 if not) and independent variables
were year (1997, 1999), sanction status (sanctioned or not), and
demographic controls-gender, age, minority status (White, Non-
White), number of children in the household, and number of
adults in the household. Analyses were not estimated for unem-
ployment benefits or government childcare, which only 3% and
4% of the sample received. An interaction term for Sanctioned
status x Year was tested in regressions and retained as a predictor
if significant. Also, a logistic regression was estimated to predict
the likelihood of being sanctioned; independent variables were
year and demographic controls. Next, to examine correlates of
increased financial strain and life strain in 1997, a second set
of logistic regressions was estimated with sanction status and
demographic controls as predictors. To see if the prevalence of
reasons for sanctions differed in 1997 and 1999, cross-tabulations
with chi-squares were conducted. For 1997 data, an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was used to see if sanction lengths differed
by the reason for the sanction.
Results
Receipt of Earnings and Benefits in 1997 and 1999,
and Financial Strain in 1997
Table 2 shows results of logistic regressions that asked if
reported receipt of wages or benefits differed by year (1997 or
1999) or for those who had been sanctioned compared to those
who had not. Confirming Hypothesis 1, compared to respondents
in 1997, those surveyed in 1999 were more likely to report having
neither work nor benefits. They were less likely to report getting
welfare but not more likely to report working. They were also
less likely to report receiving SSI/SSDI, housing benefits, food
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Table 2
Receipt of Earnings and Benefits: Percentages
by Year and Sanction Status
and Correlates,
Not
Earnings or All Sanctioned Sanctioned r
Benefits (n = 265) (n = 40) (n = 225)
No work/
No benefits
1999
Welfare 1997
1999
Earnings 1997
1999
SSI/SSDI 1997
1999
Housing 1997
benefits
Food stamps
Medical
benefits
Substance
use treatment
1997 7% 25%
23%
47%
26%
21%
26%
38%
28%
31%
3% Sanction status .17**
Year .21
Sanction status .00
Year -. 18**
Sanction status -. 08*
Year .00
Sanction status -. 06
Year -.10"
Sanction status .00
1999 17% 19% 17% Year
1997 67% 50% 71% Sanction status
1999 44% 50% 44% Year
SS x Year
1997 78% 58% 84% Sanction status
1999 54% 56% 53% Year
SS x Year
1997 10% 21% 7% Sanction status
1999 5% 19% 3% Year
-. 12"
-. 10*
-. 20***
.08*
-. 14*
-. 24****
.12*
.19*
.00
Note: Correlation coefficients (r) for receipt of earnings or benefits from logistic
regressions with Year of receipt (1= 1997,2 = 1999) and Sanction status (0 = No,
1 = Yes) as predictors.
*p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001 ****p <.0001
stamps or medical benefits. Confirming Hypothesis 2, those who
had been sanctioned were also especially likely to report having
neither work nor benefits. They were less likely than others to
report receiving wages and more likely to report receiving sub-
stance use treatment. There were two significant interactions of
Sanctioned status x Year. In 1997 (but not 1999), people who had
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been sanctioned were less likely than others to report receiving
food stamps [F(1, 116) = 3.98, p < .05; 1999, F(1, 145) = .24, ns]
or government medical benefits [F(1, 116) = 7.95, p = .006; 1999,
F(1, 145) = .05, ns]. Early in welfare reform in 1997, people may
not have realized that even if their welfare had been cut due to
sanctions, they might still be eligible for food stamps or medical
benefits. A greater proportion of clients (20%) was sanctioned in
1997 than in 1999 (11%), r = -. 09, p < .05; in 1999, relatively fewer
people received welfare or food stamps and could be sanctioned.
Demographic items did not predict sanction prevalence
Among demographic correlates of benefits receipt, those with
more children were more likely to report getting welfare (r =
.17, p < .0007), food stamps (r = .13, p < .005), and government
medical benefits (r = .16, p < .001). Those with more adults at
home were less likely to report getting welfare (r = -. 11, p < .02)
or food stamps (r = -. 11, p < .01). Minorities were more likely
than Whites to report getting welfare (r = .15, p < .002), food
stamps (r = .15, p < .002), medical benefits (r = .12, p < .008),
housing benefits (r = .15, p < .003) and substance use treatment
(r = .25, p < .001), with no difference between Blacks, Latinos, or
others on the items. Men were especially likely to report getting
substance use treatment (r = .11, p < .03), older people to report
getting SSI/SSDI (r = .12, p < .009). Not having work or benefits
was less likely among people with more children (r = -. 15, p <
.007) and minorities (r = -. 11, p < .03).
Hypothesis 3 had predicted that sanctioned individuals
would be especially likely to report financial and life strain. In
general, those in the 1997 sample reported increased financial
strain in the first six months after implementation of welfare
reform (Table 3). Yet people who had been sanctioned were es-
pecially likely to report that it was harder to pay for bills, rent,
and adult health care; were marginally more likely to report that
it was harder to pay for food; and were more likely to say that
they had moved due to lack of rent, or that their children had
changed schools. The groups did not differ in reports of having
gone without food for a day in the past month, which more than
half of each group reported. In both years, those who had been
sanctioned were less likely to report having a phone. Interviewer
notes also revealed client financial strain. Of one person sanc-
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Table 3
Relation Between Having Been Sanctioned and Financial or Life Strain
in 1997: Correlation Coefficients from Logistic Regressions
Not r for
Financial or life All Sanctioned Sanctioned Sanction
quality items (n = 118) (n = 24) (n = 94) Status
In past 6 months, harder to pay for...
Food 80% 96% 76% .12+
Bills 63% 83% 60% .13*
Rent 49% 67% 46% .10*
Adult health care 36% 67% 28% .23**
Lacked food in past month 53% 54% 52% .00
Moved due to lack of rent 17% 33% 14% .07*
Child changed schoolsa 27% 54% 22% .17*
No phone (1997 and 199 9)b 44% 60% 41% .07*
Note: Correlation coefficients (r) for financial or life strain items from logistic
regressions with Sanction status (0 = No, I = Yes) as a predictor along with
demographic controls.
a Parents in 1997 only, n = 74
bn =270+p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01.
tioned six months, an interviewer wrote, "The family had to
move, the children had to change schools. It's harder to get food.
The partner needs an operation." Of another person sanctioned 75
days, the interviewer wrote, "They cannot pay the rent, they are
afraid of eviction, the children are sent to other homes for food."
Reasons for Sanctions and Length of Sanctions
Asked why they had been sanctioned (Table 4), respondents
mentioned not working (43%), especially losing a job; minor
infractions, such as missing job appointments or leaving sub-
stance use treatment early (18%); and noncompliance with rules,
including not reporting income or not complying with job search
rules (39%). Reasons for sanctions did not differ by year [Fisher's
exact t (two-tailed) = .65, ns]. For 1997 data, sanction lengths
differed according to reasons for sanctions [F(2, 23) = 46.93, p
< .0001]. Sanctions for noncompliance were longest (about 5-6
months), followed by those for not working (3 months), which in
112 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
turn differed from those for minor infractions (about 1.5 months).
Sanctions averaged 106 days, or over three months (SD = 52;
Range, 3-180 days); 5 people's second sanctions averaged 67 days
(SD = 29).
Not working: Health, childcare and transportation. Of 19 people
sanctioned for losing work or not working, six did not explain;
two had missed work and then lost a job due to lack of childcare
or transportation, and 11 (58%) had lost work (for one, a temp
job) or not taken work due to being ill or caring for a relative
who was ill. For example, a man who took his fianc&e to the
emergency room for pneumonia was fired for coming to work
Table 4
Percentage of Reasons for Sanctions, and Mean Length of Sanctions
1997 and 1999 1997 Sanction Length
Category Within Category Within Category
Reason for Sanction n n % n M (SD)
Not working 19 11 88.6 (4.5)a
Lost job/Fired 12 (63%) 7 87.9 (5.7)
Didn't take workfare 4 (21%) 3 90.0 (0.0)
Quit job 3 (16%) 1 90.0 (0.0)
Minor infraction 8 7 49.3 (23.4)a
Missed appointment/ 6 (75%) 5 48.0 (26.8)
interview
Left substance use 2 (25%) 2 52.5 (10.6)
treatment early
Noncompliance 17 8 161.3 (35.6)a
Unreported income 5 (29%) 2 180.0 (0.0)
Broke rules 5 (29%) 3 180.0 (0.0)
Did not fulfill job search 3 (18%) 2 150.0 (42.43)
rules
Alleges social service 2 (12%) 1 90.0 (0.0)
error
Don't know 2 (12%) -
a Significant difference in sanction length in Scheffe post-hoc contrasts: Sanctions
for noncompliance longer than sanctions for not working, which are longer than
sanctions for infractions, p < .05.
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late and was sanctioned. A mother who stayed home to take care
of a sick daughter also lost work and was sanctioned. One woman
who had a doctor's note saying she was too ill to work was still
sanctioned six months for not reporting for workfare. Another
respondent who had been in an accident could not get a note
from a doctor who refused to deal with social services and was
sanctioned for not working.
People with substance use problems were also sanctioned,
including a man who quit his job because he was addicted to
cocaine. A substance-using woman subject to panic attacks quit
a workfare job after an upsetting incident at a men's shelter;
nor could she deal with the on-the-spot decision making at the
security job she got next.
It was frustrating to her that her workfare assignments didn't take
into account what she can or can't handle. There is no choice, just an
assignment to show up somewhere. She said, "Put me in a women's
shelter or let me work with old people." She seemed willing to work
but frustrated that her circumstances weren't given any credence.
Another woman spoke of a friend with HIV who risked sanctions
if she did not attend workfare even if she might feel very sick on a
particular day. "Anyone that sick should be given SSI," the friend
said. "Her health may be compromised just to return the little
benefits she does get."
Lack of childcare raised problems also. One woman missed
work and lost her job when the child's father did not come to
take the child to the babysitter; nor did she have other resources
for childcare. "The interview was difficult to conduct," the inter-
viewer wrote, "because the child was very active and trying to
ransack the office." With no money for bus fare, another woman
walked miles to work daily. One rainy day she did not want to
walk to work, lost her job, and was subsequently sanctioned.
Workfare. Five people (including three noted above) were
specifically sanctioned for not taking or continuing with social
services workfare; it is also possible that some among the six
who did not give reasons for not working were included in this
group. Workfare jobs-described as offering little advancement-
included crossing guard, security guard, work at a men's shelter,
maintenance, and other unskilled work. Assigned to move boxes
114 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
all day, a woman asked why she could not get job training. Her
interviewer wrote, "She would love some skills to help her get
a job she would enjoy. She would like to work with children."
"At workfare they change your job so often there isn't enough
training to learn," another person said. "They feel workfare just
puts them to work to pay for a living, but they can't keep the job
after, so they feel no better off," an interviewer wrote. One man
felt "upset about working through social services workfare and
not recognized as a real worker. He wants to be hired and get off
welfare."
One woman was told that social services would pay for day
care as she attended workfare classes and job interviews: "She
never got the money, and with what she received a month, the
child care bill made things worse." Applying for government
childcare, she learned that she would need to work 30 hours a
week. Her interviewer noted, "She does not want to be away from
her son that long each week. She feels he still needs the love and
care only a mother can give her own child. She does not want a
stranger raising her son. She felt it is why children are so violent."
When the woman refused workfare, she was sanctioned.
Noncompliance with welfare rules. Sanctions were also imposed
for not complying with welfare rules-including not reporting
income or not performing job search requirements-e.g., missing
a job seminar. Some sanctioned for unreported income may not
have known that they had to report workfare earnings to DSS;
receiving benefits contingent on participating in workfare, some
may have thought of workfare pay as benefits, not income. In
1999, a woman who did not report $151 in income was sanctioned
12 months. Another person sanctioned three months for job loss
was sanctioned an additional six months for unreported income.
Others who were sanctioned included a respondent whose family
member did not have a birth certificate and a woman who had not
reported a niece living with her. People in substance use treatment
were 50% of the group of 8 who were sanctioned for leaving
treatment early or missing appointments.
Other issues in implementing TANF. Welfare rules could also
be problematic in other ways. Work requirements could come at
the cost of completing college. One man left college just short
of getting a B.A. to work for benefits to support his family. A
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woman returning to school was also pressed to take workfare.
Her interviewer wrote,
She has been manic-depressive since age 11. She is having difficulty
finding the right medication. With all her depression, her husband
was able to obtain full custody of the children. She has started
college this summer taking computer science and is very excited.
She is a full-time student who has ten hours-a-week work-study.
DSS wants her to work an additional 20 hours-a-week to work off
her grant.
It was not clear if the woman would be sanctioned for not working
the 20 hours a week.
People whose benefits were cut when they got work also
spoke of rapid cuts that sometimes did not give them enough time
to get back on their feet financially, and may have contributed to
some people's then losing work. An interviewer wrote of one
man,
Shortly after starting work, Social Services took away benefits ....
He could not pay next month's rent. He, his pregnant wife and a two-
year-old daughter had nowhere to live. They moved from family to
family. They could not afford the $24/night that Salvation Army
charged. They are now back to any empty apartment, but at least
it's shelter.
Discussion
Decreased Resources Over Time and for Sanctioned Individuals
Despite reports that welfare-to-work is a success (Hobbs,
1996; USDHHS, 1997, 1998b), states have not been required to
track those who leave welfare (McClintock & Colosi, 1998), and
little is known about the effects of sanctions or benefits cuts. In
this study, the proportion of food pantry clients who said they
had no work or benefits rose from 1997 to 1999 (see NETWORK,
1999). By 1999 clients were less likely to report getting welfare,
SSI, food stamps, medical benefits, and housing benefits. Since
1996, policy changes have made it harder to get welfare, SSI,
and food stamps-reducing the number of people getting these
benefits nationally (see Lawton, Lester, Todd & Smith, 1999).
People who lost work and reapplied for TANF may also not
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have been granted it. Further, at welfare offices people may not
have been told they were eligible for TANF, Medicaid, or food
stamps-also helping to explain national declines in receipt of
these benefits since welfare reform (Keigher & Fendt, 1998; Law-
ton et al., 1999).
Because the object of welfare reform is to move people from
welfare to work, one might expect decreases in receipt of welfare
to be matched by increases in the percentage of people who work.
Yet study participants were not more likely to work in 1999 than
in 1997. In a non-metropolitan area where available jobs tend
to be low-wage or part-time-and where many people compete
for work-people may have had trouble getting or keeping jobs
(Jensen & Chitose, 1997). Working poor are also susceptible to
losing work due to layoffs or jobs ending, including temporary
or seasonal work ending (Riccio, Friedlander, & Freedman, 1994).
Lack of a high school degree-noted by 40% of the group-may
have hindered getting work too (Metsch et al., 2000). Further,
people in this poor food pantry sample may have needed more
intensive help with childcare, transportation, health care, coun-
seling, or job training to get and keep jobs.
Sanctioned individuals were especially likely to have neither
work nor benefits. People sanctioned for job loss noted problems
with health, caring for sick partners or children, and arrang-
ing childcare and transportation. After being sanctioned, respon-
dents noted greater hardship paying for adult health care, bills
and rent; a greater likelihood of moving due to lack of rent; and
less likelihood of having a phone-conditions that could make it
even harder to work.
Implications for Policy and Programs
If sanctions impose financial strain on vulnerable people,
including those who are already trying to work, one can ask if
there might be better ways to help people work. Tufts Center on
Hunger and Poverty (1998) suggested two alternatives to sanc-
tions: policies to help people work and to help develop income
and assets. States might also benefit from new definitions for
"worker" and "nonworker" as they calculate work-participation
rates and apply for TANF funds.
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Helping People Get and Keep Jobs
Providing time and resources for health care. Stereotypes hold
that welfare recipients are too lazy to get off welfare and need to
be pushed to work (Katz, 1989). Yet research suggests that many
welfare recipients do want to work and that intensive and multi-
faceted interventions help make that possible (see Strawn & Mar-
tinson, 2000, for a review.) In this study, respondents tended to
report losing work or not taking work because employers or wel-
fare offices had not been flexible when respondents encountered
problems with individual or family health concerns. Findings
suggest the importance of broad policy changes to give employees
personal, medical, or vacation time off when necessary, since
low-wage jobs tend to be inflexible about giving workers such
time (Heymann & Earle, 1999). For example, people with chronic
health problems (such as HIV) might better work if they could
take time off to deal with illness as it arose.
Substance users may also need enough time to get back on
their feet. In this study, people who had recently been in sub-
stance use treatment were over-represented among sanctioned
individuals; perhaps they had trouble meeting welfare rules due
to addiction and disorganized lives, or had trouble getting work.
Metsch et al. (2000) found that substance-using women were more
likely to make a successful transition from welfare to work when
they received at least a year of treatment and aftercare. Programs
that try to put substance users to work fast may be less successful
than those permitting people to increase work gradually and get
aftercare as they do.
Respondents also reported decreased receipt of medical bene-
fits and food stamps over time; yet some might have been eligible
for those benefits had they been informed. An application for
AFDC used to automatically trigger an application for Medi-
caid. However, TANF and Medicaid have been unlinked so that
separate applications are now needed for each (Ellwood & Ku,
1998). Some who thought they were ineligible for TANF may
not have realized they could still get Medicaid or food stamps.
Those who left welfare due to work or time limits may also not
have realized they could get a year of transitional Medicaid. In
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turn, adequate access to health care or food might have prevented
health problems that interfered with work. Research suggests that
welfare recipients are more likely to keep work when they know
what transitional benefits (e.g., transitional medical benefits) are
available, have help with paperwork (Rangarajan, 1998), and have
stronger case management before and after starting work, so
that they may better foresee and forestall problems (Hobbs, 1996;
Iversen, 1998). Further, communities that provide more options
for low-cost substance use treatment, health care, childcare, and
transportation may help workers stay in jobs and develop job
experience that promotes attachment to the community work
force (USDHHS, 1997).
Making workfare more attractive. For people who could not
get regular work, social services did offer community service
workfare, with which recipients tended to express dissatisfac-
tion. It was not clear to what extent such dissatisfaction led to
clients' noncompliance with workfare-a topic for further re-
search. Brock, Butler and Long (1993) noted that unpaid com-
munity service jobs do not generally lead to increased skills and
wages, consistent employment, or reductions in welfare; the re-
searchers called for investment of funding and staff commitment
in service jobs to ensure adequate work opportunities and clear
procedures for job placement. Caseworkers may also benefit from
learning to assess individual needs and talents before placing
people in jobs (see Iversen, 1998). However, those who have the
least education and job experience or who are least able to adapt
to work may be the most likely to take social services workfare.
Slipping up in that system, they may be subject to sanctions and
penalized further. Those individuals may come under greater
pressure as states try to raise work participation levels after hav-
ing placed "easier" cases. States and agencies may need to make
greater investments in training, counseling, and substance use
treatment to help those clients.
In imposing sanctions, welfare offices might also try to as-
sess why clients are not meeting requirements, instead of simply
punishing them if they do not (see Meyers, Glaser & MacDonald,
1998), Riccio and Orenstein (1996) found that caseworkers who
spent more time with clients were less likely to sanction them,
perhaps because staff knew clients' issues better. Agency use of
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"integrated" case managers who simultaneously handle welfare
eligibility, social services and work issues (USDHHS, 1998b) may
also help prevent social service errors and client infractions, and
better help clients keep their jobs.
Protecting Income and Assets
People who had been sanctioned were also especially likely
to report financial strain; such strain and unhappiness associ-
ated with it could have made it harder to work. For example,
people who moved due to lack of rent or who could not afford
a phone may have been harder for employers or caseworkers
to call, reducing opportunities to work. Greenberg and Savner
(1999) have suggested revising requirements for unemployment
insurance so that part-time workers are eligible for it, and so
that "good cause" for losing work may include reasons associ-
ated with loss of child care, caring for sick children, or domes-
tic violence. Strawn and Martinson (2000) have also noted that
TANF maintenance-of-effort funds used outside of TANF cash
assistance may be used as income support for people between
jobs. In general, allowing individuals on welfare to keep a larger
part of their earnings and more valuable assets-including more
valuable cars, business equipment, and savings accounts-would
help give welfare recipients a better chance to earn a living and
stave off financial setbacks. Provision of health insurance after
people leave welfare-possibly for periods longer than a year-
would also help prevent health care costs from further draining
poor people's pocketbooks (Tufts Center on Hunger and Pov-
erty, 1998).
Redefining "Worker" and "Nonworker"
In implementing welfare reform law, legislators might also
consider ways to redefine "worker" and "nonworker" in count-
ing workers for the TANF work participation formula. For exam-
ple, a broader range of activities-such as educational activities,
counseling, substance use treatment, or some combination of
these and work-might count as work for the 20-hour-a-week
requirement. In Illinois, completion of post-secondary education
may be counted as work (see Strawn & Martinson, 2000). Legisla-
tors might also lower state work quotas or might calculate work
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participation more flexibly. For example, for those on workfare
who have chronic health problems, one might count a certain
number of days of work per three months, rather than per one
month, as work. In terms of defining nonworkers, the language of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 only calls for reducing benefits to people who refuse
work, and need not include those who lose work. States might
exempt some who lose work for good cause from nonworker
totals, or might be allowed to modify work quotas in response to
a wider set of conditions, including regional unemployment rates.
Limitations of the Study and Areas for Further Research
Finally, limitations of this study should be noted. Its some-
what imprecise, retrospective measures made it hard to assess
the impact of sanctions on receipt of benefits. People could have
said both that they had been sanctioned and had received wel-
fare in the past six months, even if they also lost welfare within
the 6-month window. (Sanctions could also have involved bene-
fits reductions.) Future studies might prospectively measure the
amount and kind of assistance lost to better assess changes in
financial status and strain. Further, food pantry users may tend
to report more money strain than other social service recipients do
(NETWORK, 1999). Compared to the upstate New York county as
a whole, which had 5% and 4% rates of sanctions in 1997 and 1999,
people with sanctions were over-represented in this sample (20%
in 1997, 11% in 1999). In a more typical welfare sample, it is likely
that more people would have been working and might have felt
less financial strain. The study also was not longitudinal; 90% of
those who had been interviewed in 1997 could not be reached in
1998 for follow-up by phone-whether because they had moved
or did not originally or later have a phone; a new sample had to
be recruited in 1999. In NETWORK's (1999) study, many clients
also had no phone. Yet this would indicate that food pantries may
be a good place to study poor people who fall between the cracks.
Future studies should ask what happens to those without
work or benefits over time. In this study in 1997 sanctioned indi-
viduals were especially likely to move due to lack of rent, to have
children change schools, and to have greater difficulty paying for
adult health care. By 1999, the sample was generally less likely
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to get housing or medical benefits. Increased hardship meeting
needs for housing, education, and health care may contribute to
deeper poverty, and stress other parts of the service sector. It is cru-
cial that states track what happens to people who leave welfare,
as well as assessing the impact on agencies (such as food pantries)
to which people turn. Researchers could also ask to what extent
states are using sanctions to get fixed TANF block grant funds (see
Tyson, 1988). Where state have low employment rates but still get
full TANF grants, do the states tend to have higher sanction rates?
Do they use a broader range of reasons for imposing sanctions?
Administrative data linking employment rates, sanction rates,
and receipt of TANF funds might address such questions in this
under-researched area of the relation between policy initiatives
and program implementation (McClintock and Colosi, 1998).
To conclude, this study found that food pantry clients were
increasingly likely to have neither benefits nor work, with this be-
ing especially true of sanctioned clients too. These results may be
specific to the economically depressed area in which the research
was conducted, but may also be more geographically widespread,
as one study (NETWORK, 1999) suggested. Clearly, much more
has yet to be learned about the effects of welfare reform on people
and communities (see McClintock & Colosi, 1998) to see if and for
whom "welfare-to-work" works.
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